The Politics of Dreaming – from Diderot to Keats and Shelley by Richardson, Alan
‘In Dreams Begin Responsibilities’, Delmore Schwartz’s oblique and compact 
coming of age narrative, remains one of the most compelling American short 
stories of the last century. Its coolly seductive hold on the reader begins with its 
title, which Schwartz borrowed from an epigraph to W. B. Yeats’s poetic volume 
Responsibilities, ‘in dreams begins responsibility’, attributed by Yeats in turn to 
an ‘Old Play’ (98). Whatever the title’s ultimate provenance, its juxtaposition of 
dream and responsibility instantly sets us pondering: how could dreams, invol-
untary, cryptic and unpredictable, generate anything like duties and obligations?
The juxtaposition of politics and dreaming in this essay’s title seeks to pro-
voke a similar unsettling of categories and rethinking of conceptual boundaries. 
What could dreaming, perhaps our most private activity, have to do with poli-
tics, a set of inherently social practices? What might the political implications be 
of dreams themselves, with their strange transformations, their rambling story 
lines, their seemingly random jumps from one image or event to the next? In 
what follows, I will explore the politics of dreaming in two different but relat-
ed ways. First, I will consider the ideological significance of the very activity of 
dreaming, as it was newly understood and represented in late enlightenment and 
early Romantic culture. I will then consider the political and ideological valence 
Dreaming, seemingly a private activity, can exhibit political and ideological dimensions.  
The first part of this article looks at the ideological significance, within late Enlighten-
ment and Romantic-era culture, of the very activity of dreaming, with particular reference 
to Diderot’s Le Rêve de d’Alembert. Nocturnal dreaming and the somnambulistic behaviors 
closely associated with dreaming can and did challenge orthodox notions of the integral 
subject, of volition, of an immaterial soul, and even of the distinction between humans 
and animals. The second half of the article looks at two literary dreams, from the poetry of 
Shelley and Keats, considering how represented dreams can have pronounced ideological 
and political valences. The article as a whole illustrates the claims and methods of cognitive 
historicist literary critique. 
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of the specific dreams represented in two important Romantic poems, P. B. Shel-
ley’s Alastor and John Keats’ ‘The Eve of St. Agnes’. In both parts of this essay, 
my reinterpretation of earlier discourses and texts has been partly inspired by 
my awareness of key developments in the cognitive neuroscience of dreaming. 
As such, the analyses that follow may be considered examples of what has been 
termed ‘cognitive historicism’ (Spolsky; Richardson, Neural Sublime 1-16).
Developments in the experimental study of sleep and dreaming, for example, 
first prompted scholars to look with serious interest at Romantic-era under-
standings of dreaming that could be seen to ‘anticipate’ not Freud’s ‘dream work’ 
but a distinctively post-Freudian, neuroscientific account of dream formation 
(Lavie and Hobson). Moreover, the differences as well as the resonances between 
Romantic-era and neuroscientific understandings can prove instructive. For in-
stance, the cognitive neuroscience of dreaming shows relatively little interest in 
what scientists now term the ‘parasomnias’, such as sleepwalking or talking dur-
ing sleep; the preeminent dream researcher J. Allan Hobson devotes only three of 
the 153 pages of his highly useful Dreaming: A Very Short Introduction to the topic 
(82-84). For Hobson, as for most of his colleagues today, REM (rapid eye move-
ment) dreaming garners most attention and serves as the paradigmatic exam-
ple; parasomniac activities belong to non-REM (NREM) sleep, as do sleep onset 
dreams and the thought-like dreaming that occurs in ‘slow wave’ sleep (8). To the 
contrary, influential Romantic (and late Enlightenment) accounts of dreaming 
show a pronounced interest in somnambulism and similar behaviors, and view 
them as continuous with the vivid, hallucinatory dreaming now connected with 
REM sleep. Indeed, this connection helped give certain Romantic-era theories 
and representations of dreams their radical ideological valence.
D r e a m i n g ,  S o m n a m b u l i s m  a n d 
t h e  C o r p o r e a l  M i n d
We might start with a glance at John William Polidori’s 1815 medical thesis on 
‘Oneirodynia’, his term for somnambulism and other parasomnias, as presented 
in an important recent article by Anne Stiles, Stanley Finger and John Bulevich. 
Polidori’s thesis, composed in Latin, long remained nearly invisible to Romantic 
scholarship, although Polidori himself was well known: as Lord Byron’s friend 
and physician, as a participant in the famed ghost story contest that generated 
both Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and Byron’s fragmentary vampire tale, and as 
the author of The Vampyre (1819), the first widely popular vampire story in Eng-
lish. As Stiles and her co-authors explain, sleepwalking and other parasomnias 
suggested how the ‘human body and brain could function mechanically’, inde-
pendent of a guiding soul or of conscious volition (790). If so, might the soul and 
will themselves prove epiphenomenal or altogether fictive? Small wonder that 
sleepwalking and related unconscious behaviors became closely associated with 
the vampire, that notoriously soulless and deeply unsettling figure. 
Simply noting how the mind remained active during sleep could prove ‘con-































nalist and religious notions of a unitary subjectivity guided by conscious voli-
tion (790). But Polidori’s interest in ‘oneirodynia’ went much further. Not only 
did dreaming suggest a mind (or brain) that stayed active in the absence of con-
sciousness, but this unconsciously active mind could also engage in a number 
of seemingly guided actions with no rational subject awake to guide them. Poli-
dori’s broad definition of somnambulism includes ‘not only someone who walks 
while in a dream, but also someone who appears to wake up while still asleep, and 
who performs actions or speaks as if he were awake’ (Polidori 776). He describes 
sleepers who ‘respond to friends’ questions and discourse ably’, who dress them-
selves and ‘guzzle’ wine, who (endowed with ‘vivid imagination’) compose poems 
or essays or even edit them (776-777). We are not far here from ‘Kubla Khan’ and 
its famous headnote, which S. T. Coleridge would first publish the year after Poli-
dori completed his medical thesis (Richardson, ‘Coleridge’).
Polidori borrowed the anecdote of a priest correcting sermons in his sleep 
from the Encyclopédie, which included an article entitled ‘SOMNAMBULE, & 
SOMNAMBULISME’ by the French physician Jean-Joseph Ménuret de Cham-
baud. The Encyclopédie also proffers a generous definition of somnambulism, 
embracing the same range of activities covered by Polidori, who apparently mod-
eled his definition on that of Ménuret de Chambaud. The latter places special 
emphasis on the seeming directedness and rationality that these unconscious be-
haviors can manifest, ‘quelquefois même avec plus d’intelligence & d’exactitude’ 
[‘at times with even more intelligence and precision’, my translation] than or-
dinarily (vol. 15: 340). Given the leading role in the Encyclopédie project taken by 
Denis Diderot and Jean-Baptiste le Rond d’Alembert, it comes as no surprise that 
Diderot’s great fictional account of an elaborate dream attributed to d’Alembert, 
Le Rêve de d’Alembert [D’Alembert’s Dream], should feature a comparably broad 
range of parasomniac activities, some of which exhibit an unexpectedly high de-
gree of rational sense.
Not that coherent, connected thought and the sort of non-sense we normally 
associate with dreaming can be differentiated too readily or too definitively in 
this series of dialogues. Initially Mlle. de L’Espinasse, d’Alembert’s housemate 
though not his bedmate, has called in Dr. Bordeu precisely because d’Alembert 
seems to be raving in his uncharacteristically troubled sleep: he thrashes about, 
throws off the covers, and talks like a ‘crazy person’ (113) [‘tout l’air du délire’ 
(359)].1 Bordeu, however, who shares some of d’Alembert’s crazier ideas, can turn 
his ‘nonsense of vibrating strings and sensitive fibers’ (113) [‘galimatias de cordes 
vibrantes et de fibres sensibles’ (359)] into a penetrating and corrosive discourse 
on the mind’s instantiation in the body and its nervous system, the necessary 
illusion of the self, the secret workings of sensibility and more. Later in the dia-
logue, d’Alembert resumes talking, sometimes in his sleep and sometimes awake 
– the line between sleeping and waking, unconscious cognition and conscious 
thought, never entirely clear. In addition, during his earlier period of somniloquy 
(which Mlle. de L’Espinasse has providentially taken down), d’Alembert at times 
addresses his present friend and at times an absent and purely hallucinated in-











logue that precedes the Rêve proper (120). Although d’Alembert never walks in his 
sleep, he does exhibit several of the parasomnias, including one only delineated 
quite recently though apparently well known to Diderot: ‘sexsomnia’ or ‘sleep 
sex’ (Andersen et al.). D’Alembert masturbates in his sleep, achieving orgasm, 
after hopefully asking his lovely companion to approach more nearly. If we can 
even fondle ourselves while attempting to seduce our beloved in our sleep, what 
can’t we do without the benefit of conscious awareness?
The striking overlaps between Le Rêve de d’Alembert and Polidori’s medical the-
sis (not to mention Coleridge’s dream-generated, sexually charged ‘Kubla Khan’) 
cannot be attributed to something called ‘influence’, especially because, though 
composed in 1769, Diderot’s text remained unpublished until 1830. Rather, key 
concerns impelling these dream writings – with the brain’s activity during sleep, 
with unconscious mental and bodily behaviors, with the fragility of a unified 
self and the potential for connected discourse in the absence of conscious vo-
lition – all attest to the powerful contemporary appeal of what I have termed 
the ‘corporeal psychologies’ of the Romantic era (Richardson, British Romanticism 
1-38). In France, the main expositor of a corporeal approach to mind and mental 
behaviors was the French Revolutionary physiologist and physician Pierre-Jean-
Georges Cabanis. Cabanis drew inspiration for his corporeal approach to mind 
both from the philosophes generally and from the Montpellier School of Medicine 
in particular, not least the medical practitioner and theorist Théophile Bordeu 
(Moravia 52-60; Williams 32-41, 85-90) – the same Dr. Bordeu that Diderot fiction-
alizes in Le Rêve de d’Alembert.
Simply the fact of dreaming holds, as we have seen, potentially subversive 
implications for any philosophical or religious orthodoxy presupposing an in-
tegral, self-determined subject. More than this, the form that dreaming takes in 
‘somnambulistic’ texts further provokes skepticism toward reigning orthodoxies, 
in underscoring how an unconscious yet active brain-mind can direct quite com-
plex behaviors, including everything from dressing and walking out of the house 
to coherent conversation to poetic composition, without any waking supervi-
sion or conscious volition. Furthermore, in Le Rêve de d’Alembert, the content of 
d’Alembert’s dream monologues, along with the dialogues that surround them, 
make the radical implications of dreaming explicit. The dreaming intellectual’s 
‘nonsense’ about vibrations and fibers broaches a materialist theory of mind that 
jettisons the soul, dissolves the unity of the self, exposes conscious volition as an 
illusion, instantiates cognition and character in the brain and nervous system, 
and erodes any firm line between humans and other animals. In short, Le Rêve de 
d’Alembert ushers in a number of the most important and most radical postulates 
of the Romantic-era corporeal psychologies soon to come.
In and of itself, dreaming challenged orthodox conceptions of a unitary self, 
since dreams (and the parasomniac activities closely associated with them) im-
plied an agency independent of and even foreign to conscious subjectivity. But 
d’Alembert’s dream goes further, incorporating an explicit critique of the inte-
gral subject in the manifest content of the dream (shaped to some extent by the 































the text). D’Alembert, seconded by Bordeu and Mlle. de L’Espinasse, advances a 
series of analogies that suggest that the self is in fact an aggregate, held together 
provisionally, subject to change over time and continuous with biological pro-
cesses that antedate the singular human subject. As Andrew Curran puts it in an 
essay on ‘Monsters and the Self ’ in the Rêve, Diderot exposes the self or moi as 
a ‘spurious abstraction temporarily attached to dynamic processes that extend 
beyond the confines of a given lifetime’ (59). Diderot owes the most striking (and 
most famous) of these analogies, the human organism as a ‘swarm of bees’ (115) 
[‘essaim d’abeilles’ (361)], to the historical Bordeu himself, who had advanced the 
same metaphor in his 1767 treatise Recherches sur le tissue muqueax (Williams 37). 
Huddled together on a branch, a colony of bees seems to act as a single, unified 
organism, moving together and reacting together, and yet the ‘cluster’ [‘grappe’] 
is in fact composed of multiple agents. Fuse the bees together, d’Alembert tells 
Mlle. de L’Espinasse in his dream, and the cluster becomes, in the eyes of a given 
perceiver, a single individual, and yet the multiplicity remains. Each human in-
dividual can be understood as just such a cluster, not of bees but of ‘organs’ 
[‘organes’], which at bottom are ‘only distinct animals held together by the law 
of continuity in a general bond of sympathy, unity, or identity’ (117) [‘Ne sont 
que des animaux distincts que la loi de continuité tient dans une sympathie, une 
unité, une identité générale’ (362)].
If the seeming individual can better be seen as a hive of bees or, in another 
striking analogy, a colony of ‘polyps’ (119) [‘polypes’ (363)], then what becomes of 
personal volition? Predictably, it vanishes, yielding instead to a vision of multiple 
agents with diverse needs and conflicting wills. ‘While there is only one center of 
consciousness in an animal’, Bordeu explains, there are ‘many different impulses. 
Each organ has impulses peculiar to itself ’ (151) [‘S’il n’y a qu’une conscience dans 
l’animal, il y a une infinité de volontés; chaque organe a la sienne’ (387)]. So the 
stomach, for example, may desire food while the palate does not. What we experi-
ence as conscious volition in fact reflects the outcome of a contest among con-
tending impulses that largely fly under the radar of consciousness. Bordeu goes 
on to expose ‘free will’ [‘volunté’] as an illusion, a given volitional act reflecting 
merely the ‘most recent impulse of desire and aversion’ [‘la dernière impulsion 
du désir et de l’aversion’], or at least the most recent one to register in conscious 
awareness, since we perform countless acts in an ‘involuntary’ [‘sans vouloir’] 
manner (166-7/397). Even when awake, that is, we often act somnambulistically. 
Notice that in some of these exchanges Diderot moves between the ‘animal’ 
and the human seamlessly. This reflects yet another radical and, at the time, 
highly unorthodox move: the implicit denial of any definitive boundary between 
human beings and other animals. The opening (waking) dialogue between Dider-
ot and d’Alembert, in fact, has made this denial explicit: ‘there is no difference 
between you and the animals except in degree of organization’ (106) [‘qu’entre 
l’animal et vous, il n’y a de différence que dans l’organisation’ (353)] – in degree 
and, therefore, not in kind. It follows that there is no uniquely human soul; what 
makes us human consists in a more highly organized ‘sensibility’ [‘sensibilité’], 











In human beings, as in other animals, organization (as its root word, organ, 
implies) must ultimately be understood in purely bodily, corporeal terms. The 
material organization of the nervous system and brain (of the ‘fibers’ and their 
neural ‘center’) subtends cognition, character, emotion, behavior – everything. 
After a snatch of dialogue recounting instances of profound changes in intel-
ligence, personality and behavior following head injuries and other assorted 
neural insults, Bordeu summarizes: ‘If you disturb the center of the bundle of 
fibers [the brain], you change the whole creature whose entire being seems to be 
concentrated there’ (153) [‘Dérangez l’origine du faisceau, vou changez l’animal’ 
(388-9)]. Toward the end of the dialogue, Mlle. de L’Espinasse offers her own sum-
mary, noting that ‘memory, judgment, desires, aversions, passions, will, power, 
self-awareness’ [‘la mémoire, le jugement, lés désirs, les aversions, les passions, la 
volunté, la conscience du soi’] all depend on the precise ‘structure of the brain’ 
(169) [‘l’organisation du cerveau’ (400)]. These statements exemplify corporeal 
psychology at its most subversive and unorthodox: small wonder that the dia-
logue remained unpublished until well after Diderot’s death.
Summing up recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of dreaming, 
Hobson describes its ‘most radical assertion’ in this way: ‘our so-called minds are 
functional states of our brains’. That is, the mind is ‘not something else’: not a 
‘spirit’, not an autonomous ‘entity’ of any sort. Simply, mind ‘is the self-activated 
brain’ (58). As we have seen, the late Enlightenment-to-Romantic science of dream-
ing and ‘somnambulism’ arrived at much the same conclusion two centuries ago. 
Diderot, in fact, advances his own analogy for how the altered functional state 
of the brain significantly changes our experience of mind and self in dreaming. 
Because the brain remains active in sleep while the center of consciousness, where 
the network of fibers converges, has become temporarily weakened, the ‘master is 
thrown on the mercy of his vassals or, one might say, is abandoned to the energy 
of his own uninhibited activity’ (164) [‘Le maître est abandonné à la discrétion de 
ses vassaux, et à l’énergie effrénée de sa propre activité’ (396)]. The whole neural 
‘network’, according to Diderot’s fictionalized Bordeu, ‘relaxes’, and each indi-
vidual fiber (the ‘threads’ responsible for neural transmission) ‘moves, vibrates, 
and so transmits to the center a whole series of sensations’, self-generated from 
memories, associations, and dimly perceived external prompts (164) [‘tout le ré-
seau se relâche et … chaque filet du réseau s’agite, se meut, transmet a l’origine 
commune une foule de sensations’ (396)]. Trains of association proliferate, as 
each neural vibration can activate, on analogy with the harmonic vibrations of 
a clavichord, other fibers that have become connected with it through experi-
ence or innate predisposition (170-1/400). An example within the text concerns 
d’Alembert’s episode of what would now be termed sexsomnia: the vibrations 
ascending from one of his ‘voluptuary fibers’ (165) [‘le brin voluptueaux’ (396)], 
uninhibited by central control, trigger the alluring image of Mlle. de L’Espinasse, 
who is thus both hallucinated and really present at the same time.
The simultaneous loosening and incitement of association networks becomes 
a key aspect of the Romantic dream theories soon to come. William Hazlitt, in 































by association ‘are, as it were, untied, loosened from a common center, and drift 
along the stream of fancy as it happens’ (vol. 12: 20). Coleridge famously remarks 
on the ‘streamy Nature of Association’ in dreams, ‘streamy’ evoking both the 
heightened flow (‘Fancy and Sleep stream on’) and the meandering pathways of 
dream association (Coleridge, vol. 1: 1770, vol. 2: 2542). Coleridge draws in part on 
David Hartley, an 18th-century associationist philosopher important to a num-
ber of Romantic writers, who noted the ‘great wildness and inconsistency’ of 
dreams and attributed this to a recuperative disruption or ‘breaking’ of ‘acciden-
tal association’ (vol. 1: 385, 389). Hobson highlights this passage in Hartley as an 
early recognition of the ‘hyperassociative’ character of REM dreams (27). Recent 
neuroscience understands dream hyperassociation rather differently, however: 
less as the creative destruction of ‘accidental’ and potentially misleading associa-
tions than as the formation of loose associations and integration of new infor-
mation into existing association networks (what Hartley calls ‘trains of ideas’ 
[vol. 1: 385]). According to Hobson, writing with co-researchers Robert Stickgold, 
Laurie Scott and Cynthia Rittenhouse, REM dreaming enhances the formation 
of ‘weak’ associations (such as thief / wrong) but not ‘strong’ associations (such as 
right / wrong), facilitating the connection of ideas, images, and remembered events 
that waking consciousness might never group together. Stickgold, Scott, Ritten-
house and Hobson conclude that ‘this alteration in normal cognitive processing 
provides part of the explanation for the bizarre and hyperassociative nature of 
REM-sleep dreaming’ (188), its ‘wildness’, as Hartley puts it. The work of another 
group of dream researchers suggests that, in enhancing the ‘formation of asso-
ciation networks and the integration of [previously] unassociated information’, 
REM dreaming also facilitates the sort of creativity seen in problem solving – or, 
one might add, in famously associative poems like ‘Kubla Khan’ (Cai et al. 10130). 
Finally, it is worth noting that Hartley too attributes the bizarre inconsistency 
of dreams to changes in functional brain states: ‘for the brain, during sleep, is in 
a state so different from that in which the usual associations were formed, that 
they can by no means take place during vigilance’ (vol. 1: 385).
D r e a m s ,  t h e  D e f a u l t  M o d e  a n d 
t h e  P o e t i c a l  ( P o l i t i c a l )  I m a g i n a t i o n
Brain-based, corporeal approaches to dreaming – in Diderot’s time as in our own 
– may strike some as reductive, especially in relation to the content of dreams. 
The tradition of mining dreams for revelatory, richly symbolic material goes back 
at least to the Old Testament and found its great modern expositor in Sigmund 
Freud, a tradition that Hobson still feels required to combat on occasion (15-
17, 134). Empirical research on dreaming simply will not support the claims of 
Freud – or of Joseph – to uncovering the ‘true’ meaning behind the disconnected 
narratives and bizarre imagery characteristic of REM dreams. It does not follow, 
however, that cognitive neuroscience has nothing of moment to say about the 
relation of dreaming to such topics as creativity, imagination or meaningfulness. 











ways to approach such connections. I will turn now to consider recent work by 
Hobson’s colleague Stickgold, a research psychiatrist specializing in the cogni-
tive neuroscience of dreaming, that could hardly be termed reductive, save in the 
sense that Stickgold (in common with virtually all prominent brain researchers 
today) does assume the fundamental identity of mind and brain. 
Pursuing interconnections among ‘sleep, memory, dreams, meaning, and lit-
erature’ (91), Stickgold provides the outlines of a scientific and broadly humanis-
tic approach to dreaming, imagination and what neuroscientists term the brain’s 
‘default mode’ that considers a broad range of human imaginative activity, begin-
ning with the wildly imaginative creativity experienced in dreams. For Stickgold, 
dreaming and other imaginative activities involve nothing less than the ‘con-
struction of meaning’, a fundamental human activity involving such processes 
as forming ‘associations, relationships, regularities, and rules’ and constantly 
reordering both the remembered ‘context of an individual’s life to date’ and the 
‘imaginal space’ of his or her personal future (76-77). These meaning-making 
processes can take place both consciously and unconsciously and can proceed in 
a ‘bottom-up’ manner – building meaning up from detached images, experiences, 
ideas – or coalesce in a ‘top-down’ manner instead (89). According to Stickgold, 
the bottom-up mode is typified by dreams, the top-down mode by literature.
Indeed, for Stickgold dreams, which he reasonably assumes preceded even 
simple oral narratives in human mental and cultural evolution, constitute our 
true ‘ur-literature’ (88). Both dreaming and imaginative literature involve ‘nar-
rative, emotionality, bizarreness, sudden shifts in time and place, metaphor, and 
meaning’ (88). And REM dreaming recruits many of the same brain areas as well 
as performing some of the key functions of the brain’s default mode: a set of 
cognitive processes active when the brain-mind is not otherwise engaged, includ-
ing episodic memory, prospective thinking about the future, ‘theory of mind’ 
or thinking about other people’s mental states and daydreaming or wandering 
thoughts (90). All this leads Stickgold to a tantalizing conclusion: ‘a major func-
tion of the brain is not all that different from the function of literature’ (90). 
Stickgold’s dream research exemplifies how cognitive neuroscience has circu-
itously returned to a notion of imagination that would have been familiar to the 
writers of high Romanticism, one that credits imagining with such fundamental 
aims as meaning-making, pattern construction, novel discrimination of resem-
blances and ‘similes’, intuition and creative invention (76, 81).
According to Stickgold, dreams provide a window into the workings of the 
brain-mind as it engages in a bottom-up process of meaning construction with 
little or nothing in the way of executive control. REM sleep ‘represents a brain 
state in which novel and unexpected associations are more readily identified, en-
hancing creativity, the discovery of insight, and the construction of meaning’ 
(87). This ‘enhanced associative activity’ is facilitated by the unique neurochemis-
try of REM dreaming, characterized by high levels of acetylcholine and low levels 
of norepinephrine and serotonin, greatly reducing cognitive accuracy and reli-
ability while increasing the forming of the sort of loose associations that may 































ized brain areas, those linked to reasoning and executive function barely register, 
while emotion areas such as the limbic system show high levels of activity.
The larger pattern of neural activation also overlaps with brain areas that 
neuroimaging studies have identified as constituting the brain’s default network 
(Buckner, Andrews-Hanna and Schacter; Spreng, Mar and Kim; Richardson, ‘De-
faulting’ 672, 685-689). This, Stickgold argues, helps us understand the narrative 
construction of dreams, since narrative forms a common thread among various 
cognitive activities implicated in the brain’s default mode, notably including 
episodic memory or ‘recall of autobiographical memories’, theory of mind or 
‘divining the thoughts and intents of others’ and prospection, ‘imagining fu-
ture worlds and scenarios’. In the default mode, Stickgold continues, the brain’s 
‘greater purpose’, like that of literature, is ‘both to create a personal understand-
ing of the world in which we live and to expand its boundaries’ – to give meaning 
to experience encoded and stored as information and to construct new orderings 
and possibilities (90-91). These functions may be seen writ large in the activity of 
the ‘dreaming brain’ (91). 
The connections posed here by Stickgold between dreaming, meaning mak-
ing, literature and various ‘default’ functions had been previously explored, 
though in markedly different ways, during the Romantic era: a time of intense 
and in many ways unprecedented interest in dreaming and other mental phe-
nomena associated with unconscious or spontaneous brain activity. An early ‘de-
fault mode’ approach to dreaming can in fact be traced in two celebrated and no-
toriously complex dreams represented in the poetry of Shelley (the poet’s dream 
of the ‘veiléd maid’ in Alastor [Shelley 73-75]) and Keats (Madeline’s dream of 
Porphyro in ‘The Eve of St. Agnes’ [Keats 312-315]). Both Keats and Shelley, as is 
now well known, took a pronounced interest in their era’s pioneering brain sci-
ence, which both established the ground for and resonates in remarkable ways 
with the cognitive neuroscience of our own time (Richardson, British Romanticism 
114-150; Ruston 74-101).
To begin with, each of the invented dreams in question draws on images 
stored in memory in the process of envisioning a personal future – precisely the 
relation that neuroscientific studies of the ‘default system’ pose between episodic 
memory and ‘prospective thinking’ or, more colloquially, ‘imagining the future’ 
(Schacter, Rose and Buckner). The poet protagonist of Alastor, having glimpsed 
but consciously slighted a love-struck ‘Arab maiden’ not two dozen lines earlier 
in the poem, now dreams of a similarly dark-haired, exotic ‘veiléd maid’ who em-
bodies ‘hopes that never yet / Had flushed his cheek’. Madeline, for her part, goes 
to sleep anticipating (following traditional ritual practices) ‘visions of delight’, 
specifically (according to a variant text) of ‘her future lord’; she fills in these vi-
sions with remembered images of her forbidden lover, Porphyro. Both dreams 
also feature another key function of the brain’s default mode, ‘theory of mind’ 
(or ‘mindreading’) activities: Madeline is attempting to determine magically the 
marital intentions of her beloved, while the Alastor poet extrapolates an entire 
character from the amorous looks, seductive tones, flushing skin and revealing 











meaning-making, with Madeline literally putting a face on her deepest and most 
secret hopes, and the poet-hero of Alastor embodying the poetic practices, the 
political hopes and the thoughts ‘most dear to him’ in the form of an idealized 
female counterpart.
In both poems, the psychological status of the represented dream proves dif-
ficult to pin down with any great precision: is it a dream proper, a reverie or a 
visionary experience? Here the literary works notably depart from neuroscientific 
paradigms, muddying the very distinctions that science thrives by – much as 
dreaming, waking and reverie bleed into one another in Le Rêve de d’Alembert. Alas-
tor seems initially to present a straightforward case of nocturnal dreaming: ‘He 
dreamed a veiléd maid / Sate near him’. Yet the dream is introduced as a vision-
ary experience – ‘a vision on his sleep there came’ – suggesting that some inter-
nal or even external agency has produced a vision marked by greater coherence 
and memorability than dreaming would ordinarily produce. (‘The spirit of sweet 
human love has sent / A vision to the sleep of him who spurned / Her choicest 
gifts’.) And although the dream or vision enters ‘on his sleep’, at its conclusion 
the poet seems to fall back to sleep at its anticlimactic climax: ‘Now blackness 
veiled his dizzy eyes … sleep … rolled back its impulse on his vacant brain’. The 
reader is left with all too many intriguing questions: does the ‘spirit of sweet hu-
man love’ represent the poet’s deep, inarticulate and repressed passions or a form 
of supernatural agency or both? And has he been fully asleep, experiencing what 
would now be called REM dreaming, or lulled into a receptive state of waking 
reverie? Or does Shelley, like Hobson, Stickgold and other 21st-century dream 
researchers, understand nocturnal dreaming as a type of conscious experience 
(Hobson, Pace-Schott and Stickgold)?
Determining the status of Madeline’s dream in ‘The Eve of St. Agnes’ proves 
if anything more perplexing and can be seen as a crux, perhaps an unresolvable 
one, for literary interpretation of the poem, at least in its published form.2 Some 
elements are clear: Madeline has fallen into an ‘azure-lidded sleep’, primed to 
dream of her future beloved and duly dreaming of Porphyro. That same Por-
phyro has cleverly, or treacherously, take your pick, managed to ensconce himself 
in Madeline’s chamber and attempts to wake her up. He fails – her dream proves 
‘Impossible to melt’ – and then Porphyro himself falls into a profound, dream-
like reverie, ‘entoil’d in woofed phantasies’. When he comes to, he tries singing 
to Madeline, which finally has an effect: ‘she panted quick – and suddenly / Her 
blue affrayéd eyes wide open shone’. And then the poem continues, teasingly: 
‘Her eyes were open, but she still beheld, / Now wide awake, the vision of her 
sleep’. Of course, since she was just dreaming of Porphyro and is now looking 
into his face, the dream may simply have ended and a waking experience of Por-
phyro taken its place. Yet the poem suggests, with such details as ‘she look’d so 
dreamingly’, that Madeline, though awake, remains in a dreamlike state. More-
over, the dream itself, even before she wakes, has incorporated Porphyro’s actual 
presence and movements: ‘even now / Thy voice was at sweet tremble at mine 
ear’. The lines between dreaming and sense perception, sleeping and waking, vir-































and Polidori, sees dreaming through the lens of ‘somnambulism’ as it was then 
understood.
The poem even broaches the possibility of sexsomnia, as Porphyro, now thor-
oughly aroused, somehow begins to participate in Madeline’s ‘dream’: ‘Into her 
dream he melted’. Again, the reader is left with unresolvable questions: does this 
line imply that Madeline has been dreaming all along? Or that ‘dream’ has moved 
from a literal to a metaphoric sense? Or, perhaps, that nocturnal dreaming has 
shaded imperceptibly into daydreaming, a half-conscious erotic reverie? In any 
case, Porphyro feels required to say, at the end of their dreamy, passionate en-
counter, ‘This is no dream, my bride, my Madeline’. A statement that Madeline by 
no means takes as obvious: ‘No dream, alas! alas! and woe is mine!’. If one takes 
this to mean that Madeline, at least, has up to then remained in or (alternatively) 
subsided back into a dream state, then sexsomnia, at least on her part, becomes 
a tempting resolution for the crux. On the other hand, if Madeline has more 
than half woken up, does she willingly engage in an erotic encounter under cover 
of somnambulism, or, more than half asleep, has she been a victim (as students 
sometimes assume) of what would now be called ‘date rape’ (Marcus 375)?
Notice how both dream passages, in Shelley as well as in Keats, end woefully: 
the poet in Alastor also cries, or the narrator cries out for him, ‘Alas! Alas!’. In each 
case a process including (but perhaps not coterminous with) dreaming has drawn 
on memories to image forth a possible future, giving form to intimate hopes and 
desires, and yet produced a profound dissatisfaction with the quotidian world 
of waking experience. Madeline cannot reconcile Porphyro’s actual appearance 
with the ‘looks immortal’ beheld in her dream: ‘How chang’d thou art! how pal-
lid, chill, and drear!’. The Alastor poet has no present image to compare with the 
exotic maid’s imagined one: she has no existence outside his dream world, evacu-
ating the everyday world of all meaning: ‘His wan eyes / Gaze on the empty scene 
as vacantly / As ocean’s moon looks on the moon in heaven’. This world of pale, 
watery reflections proves painfully inadequate to the visionary world of dream 
and reverie. Both poems imply that the imaginative construction of meaning can 
backfire, and end by draining meaning from ordinary life.
Finally, both dreams are highly allusive and self-consciously literary, suggest-
ing both poets’ awareness that dreaming, seemingly a private activity, in fact par-
ticipates in public discourses; that, like other narrative acts, dreaming must draw 
on a collective storehouse of images and on shared cultural codes. At the individ-
ual human level, meaning and meaningfulness must be understood, as Stickgold 
stresses, as ‘personal’: each mind-brain (or, if one prefers, each subject) uniquely 
situated in time and space, situated, moreover, in a unique body, and with its own 
distinctive array of memories and other information traces, will develop its own 
idiosyncratic set of meanings. And yet these meanings interact pervasively with 
and are largely constructed from larger social networks of meaning – including 
those complex networks we gesture toward with terms like culture, ideology, habitus 
and background. 
Nothing could be more personal to Madeline than her romantic hopes and 











of the cultural expectations and social scripts to which she is exposed. It is no 
accident that this romance begins in an institutional setting, a Catholic church. 
The St. Agnes’ Eve ritual that Madeline must follow in order to dream of her 
husband-to-be is one performed by countless other Madelines before, since, and 
no doubt on that same chilly evening. The fifth stanza of the poem, heralding the 
entrance of Madeline and the rest of the local gentry into the church, could hard-
ly be more emphatic on how each developing mind (Keats actually says ‘brain’) 
gets ‘stuff’d’ with established cultural scripts (299):
At length burst in the argent revelry,  
With plume, tiara, and all rich array,  
Numerous as shadows haunting fairily  
The brain, new stuff’d, in youth, with triumphs gay  
Of old romance.
Porphyro too acts out a script from ‘old romance’, though just what script pre-
cisely remains under debate. Porphyro himself calls it ‘La belle dame sans mercy’ 
(the song he sings to dreaming Madeline); others see Porphyro less as a love-
struck, despairing knight than a predatory figure related to the conventional 
demon lover or even to the vampire (Stillinger, ‘The Hoodwinking of Madeline’ 
539-540; Stillinger, Reading 46-47). Either way, Porphyro hijacks the St. Agnes’ Eve 
ritual not to disrupt it but to insert himself into the ‘future lord’ slot, and his 
singing of an ‘ancient ditty’ to a sleeping Madeline may well reflect his attempt to 
channel her dreaming into a stereotypical romantic narrative of his own choos-
ing.
The ill-fated dream date in Alastor rehearses a basic scenario endemic to Ori-
entalist writing of the long 18th century: the adventurous male European finding 
his ultimate erotic partner in an exotic, idealized, Oriental woman. (This scenario 
is sometimes termed, in cultural studies shorthand, ‘the exotic is the erotic’, a 
formula that goes back as far as Praz [207].) More specifically, Shelley borrows 
heavily here from an earlier Romantic-era narrative describing just such a cultur-
ally fraught and erotically overcharged encounter: Sydney Owenson’s Orientalist 
novel The Missionary. Although Shelley’s Orientalized singer departs in certain 
important ways from Owenson’s Luxima – the veiléd maid, for example, chants 
of ‘divine liberty’ while Luxima devotes her songs to ‘Camdeo, the god of mystic love’ 
(99) – Shelley consciously and overtly models his exotic poetess on Owenson’s 
(then) celebrated Hindu vestal (Judson). Most saliently, the Alastor poet encoun-
ters his visionary maid in the ‘vale of Cashmire’, Luxima’s home in The Missionary 
and a setting already made famous for its lushness and pristine ‘Indian’ charac-
ter by the great Orientalist Sir William Jones. Like Luxima, Shelley’s visionary 
maid ineffectively screens a ‘lovely and luxuriant’ person behind a diaphanous 
veil, sings inspired verses in a hauntingly beautiful voice, combines ‘purity’ with 
an irresistibly erotic manner, sports ‘long dark hair’ that ‘floated in the wind’ and 
reveals her passionate nature in a fit of ‘soft and unrepressed transport’ (Owen-































miss the veiléd maid’s pronounced resemblance to Luxima (who also appears 
‘like the tender vision which descends upon Passion’s dream’ [162]) and Shelley 
does not want them to. The Alastor poet’s dream represents at one and the same 
time ‘Thoughts the most dear to him’ and a stock cultural script already well 
established in British Orientalist literature.
Each dream participates in larger-scale ideological discourses, particu-
larly in relation to gender and empire. In rehearsing the stock Orientalist fan-
tasy scenario of an exceptional European male overcoming the resistance 
(‘she drew back awhile’) of an exotic beauty, Alastor implicitly endorses the 
‘Western=male=dominant / Asian=female=subordinate’ equation endemic to 
Orientalist discourse. This equation is unabashedly spelled out in Shelley’s pri-
mary source for this encounter, the meeting of Hilarion and Luxima in Owen-
son’s Missionary: ‘they stood finely opposed, the noblest specimens of the human 
species, as it appears in the most opposite regions of the earth: she, like the East, 
lovely and luxuriant; he, like the West, lofty and commanding’. Owenson only 
intensifies this fundamental contrast and the power differential it implies as the 
passage goes on: ‘she, looking like a creature formed to feel and to submit; he, 
like a being created to resist and to command’ (109). Shelley seeks to qualify this 
opposition by making the veiled maid both poetically inspired and politically in-
formed, and indeed Owenson’s narrative sometimes puts into question the same 
contrast it so blatantly poses, yet in each case the basic scenario confirms an 
deeply unequal social relation between European and Oriental, male and female.
‘The Eve of St. Agnes’, in its own uneasy manner, gives literary form to key 
aspects of the bourgeois domestic ideology of the era: Madeline is associated 
with domestic interiors, with passive positions (supine in bed) and with romantic 
fantasy, while Porphyro has the freedom to come and go (even on enemy terri-
tory), takes active roles, and proves capable of manipulating romance patterns 
to his own (however dubious) ends. The St. Agnes’ Eve ritual in itself implies 
that the chief business of bourgeois women like Madeline must be to marry; the 
dream reveals not whether to marry, but whom. More than that, the very pro-
phetic character of the dream implies a lack of agency: Madeline will not choose 
Porphyro, but hopes to be chosen by him. Porphyro’s singing of ‘La Belle Dame 
Sans Merci’ might seem to subtly undermine this formula, implying that it is the 
woman who chooses, who decides whether to pity her beseeching lover or not, 
yet (especially in context) the allusion to courtly romance traditions does not so 
much overturn the domestic ideology of Keats’s time as obscure or disavow its 
ineluctable force.
C o n c l u s i o n
Are dreams ever to be considered ‘private’, do they ever reflect solely the preoc-
cupation and movements of an individual mind? In an important consideration 
of Le Rêve de d’Alembert in the broader context of Diderot’s ‘dynamic materialism’, 
Wilda Anderson suggests that d’Alembert’s dream itself may be viewed as a kind 











disintegral subject that receives it (1, 65). The dream incorporates ideas suggested 
by the fictional Diderot in the preliminary dialogue no less than the sleeping 
d’Alembert’s reactions and elaborations, these in turn shaped by the contribu-
tions of Mlle. de L’Espinasse (who writes out the first part of the dream and 
whose presence clearly shapes it) and Bordeu, who at times fills out the lacunae 
in Mlle.’s transcription and whose own suggestions and elaborations become in 
turn drawn into d’Alembert’s somniloquy. The participants in the dialogue, in 
Anderson’s reading, resemble the ‘bee swarm’ in the dialogue itself: ‘Our inter-
locutors … have not lost their own identities, but they have managed to construct 
a larger identity that includes them all—all four of them’ (66). And, as we have 
noticed, this exemplary dialogical dream also incorporates any number of con-
temporary physiological and ideological discourses, sometimes (as in the borrow-
ing of that same bee swarm image from a prior text of Bordeu’s) in a manifestly 
knowing manner. Like the dreams represented by Keats and Shelley, d’Alembert’s 
dream includes intertextual as well as dialogical and ideological dimensions that 
extend well beyond the dreamer’s individual subjectivity, or rather, expose the 
corporate and interdependent nature of all human subjectivity.
Over the course of this essay, I have made two complementary arguments, 
reflecting the dual focus informing the practice of cognitive historicism. In rela-
tion to historical literary interpretation, I hope to have shown that informed at-
tention to cognitive neuroscience in the present can elicit unnoticed or underval-
ued aspects of past literary artifacts and discourses. Lessons from the cognitive 
neuroscience of dreaming, for example, can help us appreciate the ideological 
challenge posed by Enlightenment and Romantic accounts and representations 
both of dreams and of the very activity of dreaming. The work of Stickgold in 
particular can help us to new appreciations of old connections between dreaming 
and literary creativity, as well as to views of dreaming in relation to a whole suite 
of activities – including remembering the past, imagining a possible future and 
speculating on the emotions and intentions of others – newly grouped together 
as aspects of the brain’s default system.
Cognitive historicist literary investigation can, in turn, reveal some of the bi-
ases and potential blind spots of scientific research agendas. The emphasis placed 
by current scientific dream researchers on REM dreaming, for example, may 
downplay some of the more unorthodox implications of the brain’s activity dur-
ing sleep. It seems notable that dream science should have ‘discovered’ sexsomnia 
only quite recently, although Diderot represented it over two centuries ago and it 
arguably features in one of Keats’s best known poems. Sleep sex brings out quite 
graphically the disturbing (not to say titillating) aspects of a brain unshackled 
from conscious supervision and cultural norms, troubling notions of agency and 
volition, in an especially salient manner. Earlier theories and representations of 
dreaming also serve to remind us that at least some of the lines drawn by scien-
tific investigators – say, between dreaming and reverie, or waking and sleeping 
consciousness, which in Diderot, Shelley and Keats seamlessly blend into one 
another – may ultimately prove overstated, however useful for the purposes of 































Most importantly, the literary texts examined here remind us that dreams 
reveal ideological as well as emotional investments, construct personal meanings 
out of public discourses and confound any firm division between private and po-
litical. All three texts break down any sense of private ownership of a given dream, 
suggesting instead that dreams (at least invented, literary dreams) exhibit, like 
other discursive forms, dialogical features: in the corporate subjectivity inform-
ing ‘d’Alembert’s’ dream, in the ways that Porphyro helps shape and even enters 
into Madeline’s dream (‘into her dream he melted’), and in the patent rehearsal 
of an earlier Orientalist text in the Alastor poet’s dream of his veiled maid. Each 
dream also evokes pressing social and ideological issues: Diderot’s materialist cri-
tique of a whole range of contemporary orthodoxies, Shelley’s engagement with 
a highly gendered version of Orientalist discourse, Keats’s underscoring, critical 
or not, of the domestic ideology recently challenged by Mary Wollstonecraft and 
other pioneering feminists. And yet all three of these fictional dreams harbors 
utopian tendencies as well, not least in the way they unleash erotic energies in 
defiance of social and literary notions of decorum. The dreamer never ceases to 
function as a political and ideological subject, even as discrete individual subjec-
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N o t e s
1 Quotations from Diderot are given first in English, from the translation in Barzun and Bowen’s 
edition, and then in the French original, following the 2010 Gallimard edition by Michel Delon. 
Where two page numbers are given separated by a slash, the second refers to the French edition. 
2 Keats produced a revision of lines 314-322, which his publishers refused to accept, that included 
the phrase ‘Still, still she dreams’ (Stillinger, 1999 26-27). For Stillinger, this version ‘makes clear-
er that Madeline is still dreaming’ (Stillinger, ‘The Hoodwinking of Madeline’ 545), but what 
then do we make of the phrase, in the previous stanza, ‘now wide awake’? To me, the passage 
remains highly ambiguous.
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